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In this article, indicators of fiscal discretionality are estimated
using a simple methodology, and in this way the cyclical com-
ponent of the public accounts balance (i.e., the amounts of in-
come and expenditure associated with transitory movements of
the level of activity) is identified for a number of Latin Ameri-
can countries in the 1990s. The difference gives a measure of the
discretional balance, which represents a medium-term indicator
of the state of the public accounts. Budgetary rules which take
account of these mechanisms not only ensure sustainability over
time but also reduce the cyclical nature of the public finances,
provided they are applied in a transparent and symmetrical man-
ner. This method provides series which make it possible to fol-
low up the structural and cyclical components of public deficits
in Latin America, using a standard methodology and with mini-
mal information needs, in order to focus the relevant discussions
(and the necessary adjustments) on a medium-term horizon.
I
Introduction
The challenge of reconciling macroeconomic stabil-
ity with satisfactory growth and improvements in in-
come distribution can only be faced by shaping a
new “fiscal covenant” in the region (ECLAC, 1998).
This fiscal covenant must be based on solid founda-
tions, with an institutional design which takes due
account of the two sacred principles of stability and
responsibility. The principle of stability means that
the government must manage the public finances in a
transparent and predictable manner, in keeping with
the objectives of high and stable rates of growth and
employment. The principle of responsibility, for its
part, means ensuring the long-term sustainability of
decisions, while avoiding disproportionate tax bur-
dens or excessive levels of public debt. Fiscal policy
has two macroeconomic objectives: sustainability of
the fiscal accounts and regulation of aggregate de-
mand; clearly, efforts have been concentrated on the
first of these, leaving the stabilization role –when it
has existed at all– to monetary policy. In order to
construct this new fiscal covenant, governments
must recover greater degrees of freedom and take on
a more active role in the task of reducing the volatil-
ity of the economies and improving their macroeco-
nomic performance.
In this article, emphasis is placed on the impor-
tance of creating suitable conditions for the full oper-
ation of the automatic fiscal stabilizers in the design
and application of fiscal policy (section II below). As
in previous studies (Martner, 1996 and 1998), the
aim is to prepare some simple indicators that will
make it possible to assess the importance of the cy-
clical component in the public sector accounts in
Latin America. Fluctuations in the level of economic
activity have a significant influence on the public ac-
counts and also have a stabilizing effect on GDP. The
automatic fiscal stabilizers may thus be defined as
those types of public income and expenditure which
are directly linked with the economic cycle. For a
given budget, when there is lower economic growth
there will be a public deficit whose counterpart is lower
tax payments by the private agents. This apparent fall
in taxes avoids a reduction in those agents’ income and
excessive contraction of their expenditure, thus mod-
erating fluctuations in their demand.
The automatic fiscal stabilizers help to stimulate
the economy in periods of recession and moderate it
in booms, thus exercising a regulatory function.
Governments have the option of allowing these auto-
matic stabilizers to operate without intervention, or
strengthening or restricting their effects through
discretional polices. During a recession, for example,
the instinctive reflex reaction of the authorities is to
avoid an increase in the public deficit by applying
pro-cyclical policies that tend to make the situation
worse. It is therefore vital to weigh the mechanisms
applied carefully in order to avoid over-adjustments
that can seriously harm the general economic situa-
tion and the efficacy and efficiency of public poli-
cies.
If the aim is to seek a balanced budget in “nor-
mal” economic conditions, it is necessary to assess
the influence and persistence of these automatic fis-
cal stabilizers in Latin America. The importance of
these mechanisms depends on many factors, includ-
ing the weight of the public sector in the economy,
the progressiveness of the tax system, the existence
of public employment and unemployment benefit
schemes, and the sensitivity of unemployment to
variations in the gross domestic product (GDP). These
structural characteristics vary considerably from one
country to another, and also over time.
What must be done above all, however, is to de-
fine what “normality” means, and with it the position
of the economy in the cycle. Economic policy man-
agement is inconceivable without a due distinction
between trends and cycles (section III). The old con-
cept of the product gap is defined as the distance be-
tween the effective GDP and the trend GDP, and it
seeks to provide a simple summary measure of such
normality. Many methods have been proposed –both
statistical and structural– for identifying the position
of the economy with respect to its growth potential.
In order to make a proper diagnosis it is of crucial
importance to distinguish between three concepts
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that tend to be confused with each other: the poten-
tial GDP, the trend GDP and the mean GDP. The poten-
tial GDP is defined as the level of activity compatible
with a stable level of inflation. The trend GDP may
be distinguished from the mean GDP because it incor-
porates stochastic components, which means that the
most recent years are assigned greater weight than
those further back in the past. If trend growth and
mean growth are confused with each other, this gives
a linear representation of the GDP gap which may
not properly describe the situation of economies
subject to continual supply disturbances. The statisti-
cal methods used to estimate the potential GDP as-
sume that it oscillates around the effective GDP, so
that a sustainable growth rate cannot depart very
much from the recent past, as recorded in the trend
GDP. Subject to these clarifications, we can speak in-
differently of the trend and potential GDPs, in so far
as the former is the direct consequence of the latter.
If what is sought is an elementary and immediate
measurement of the GDP gap, the Hodrick-Prescott
(HP) filter provides an estimate of the trend GDP,
which is assimilated to the potential GDP
through the assumption of symmetry of the macro-
economic cycle.
In this article, a detailed analysis is made of the
estimation of the GDP gap for twelve countries of the
region in the 1990s (section III). In order to facilitate
comparative analysis, we have used the method of
estimation employed by the European Commission,
which (leaving aside the question of the virtues or
shortcomings of this method) defines the GDP gap as
the difference between the effective GDP and the po-
tential GDP, expressed as a percentage of the latter.
In Latin America, the relative size of the cyclical
public deficit depends on the magnitude of macro-
economic fluctuations and the sensitivity of public
income to the level of activity. Using a number of
simplifying assumptions, in this article we calculate
the magnitude of the automatic fiscal stabilizers and
present estimates of the cyclical balance of the
non-financial public sector for twelve Latin Ameri-
can countries in the 1990s (section IV). According to
these calculations, the cyclical component reaches
maximum levels exceeding one percentage point of
GDP in the countries with the highest tax rates and/or
the greatest volatility, such as Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Peru and Uruguay. Although these figures are
lower than those for the countries of the Organiza-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), they are nevertheless quite significant, in
view of the limited leeway for fiscal policy manage-
ment in our region. Applying anti-cyclical policies is
usually a complex matter in practice, but failing to
do so may be even more harmful. What is involved
is the creation, through explicit mechanisms, of the
spaces necessary for the full operation of the auto-
matic fiscal stabilizers. When short-term fiscal bal-
ance goals are fixed, both the national authorities and
international agencies should take the effects of the
prevailing situation into account.
Budgetary rules which provide for these mecha-
nisms can not only ensure sustainability over time
but also reduce the cyclical nature of the public fi-
nances, provided they are applied in a transparent
and symmetrical manner. It is therefore necessary
that there should be ongoing monitoring of the
structural and cyclical components of public deficits,
using standardized methods and up-to-date informa-
tion, in order to focus discussion (and the required
adjustments) on a medium-term horizon (ECLAC,
1998).
II
Creating spaces for the operation
of the automatic fiscal stabilizers
As we have seen in the case of a number of countries
of the region in recent decades, the budget may be
involved in a situation of explosive (“snowballing”)
growth of the public debt, in which a growing pro-
portion of income is generally absorbed by interest
payments. Unless irresponsibly expansionary
policies are being applied, this perverse dynamic is
usually exogenous to the public sector. The stability
of the debt/GDP coefficient depends of course on the
difference between the growth rate of the economy
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and the real interest rate at which the public sector is
contracting debt. When the former rate is higher than
the latter (positive differential) it is possible to fi-
nance a certain level of deficit by indebtedness with-
out increasing the public debt burden, but when the
differential is negative, the persistence of a primary
deficit gives rise to explosive growth of the debt and
of interest payments which endangers the solvency
of the public sector. In this way, if the interest rate
rises and the growth rate falls, the sustainability of
fiscal policy is immediately brought into question.
Thus, a restrictive monetary policy has an ad-
verse impact on the public sector, especially if the
exchange rate rises and the public debt has a signifi-
cant external component. The efficiency of exclusive
and/or excessive use of monetary policy to stabilize
the economy is open to doubt. Management of the
interest rate helps to correct unsustainable move-
ments in private expenditure, but it can also generate
or aggravate a dynamic which is potentially
destabilizing on the fiscal side. Lack of coordination
between monetary and fiscal policies leads to a situa-
tion marked by excessively high interest rates and a
high public deficit.
So, if the objective is to stabilize the public debt
but monetary financing is not available, a situation of
stagnation and high interest rates makes it necessary
to generate increasingly large primary surpluses.
When a public balance target is fixed independently
of the evolution of the level of activity and the rest of
the macroeconomic variables, budgetary policy be-
comes markedly pro-cyclical, reducing expenditure
or increasing taxes every time the interest rate rises
or the level of activity goes down. This type of bud-
getary management heightens the uncertainty of the
environment in which private decisions are taken. By
rationally anticipating this policy, the private agents
will tend to act in a pro-cyclical manner, since a
slackening of public demand will foreshadow a re-
duction in private demand. Thus, adopting deficit
and public debt targets without considering their ef-
fects on macroeconomic stability pushes the econ-
omy towards a recessionary trap in which the deficit
targets cannot be fulfilled because of the private sec-
tor adjustment and the fiscal adjustment further de-
presses private activity. The stabilizing potential of
fiscal policy has not been sufficiently used in our re-
gion, which is marked by excessive fluctuations that
adversely affect long-term growth.1
1. Reducing the severity of economic cycles
The sustainability of fiscal policy is usually defined
as a state of stability of the public debt in a determin-
ist world, but it can also be interpreted as a stationary
state of that debt in a stochastic world (Hénin, 1997).
The government is solvent if the public debt/GDP or
public balance/GDP ratios are stationary variables.
Sustainability is simply the long-term solvency of
the government, which means that it must respect its
inter-temporal budgetary constraints. What endangers
the government’s solvency is not so much a deficit
as the persistence of deficits at an excessive level.
The neoclassical theory of tax smoothing holds
that tax rates should be kept constant over the eco-
nomic cycle in order to minimize the costs arising
from distortive taxes. Optimal fiscal policy gives pri-
ority to sustainability over time, thus leaving room to
adapt the public balance to the macroeconomic cir-
cumstances. The normative component is flexible,
with a constant rate of taxation being preferred to an
annual budget balance rule. Bohn (1995) considers
that fixing ceilings for the deficit and the debt with a
probability of 1 is an over-restrictive rule in a sto-
chastic world.
The Keynesian view of this stochastic world is
not very different from the foregoing. For traditional
Keynesians, fiscal policy should ensure surpluses in
situations of full employment and accept deficits in
recessions, giving a zero average balance over the
cycle. Although some authors do not emphasize it as
much as it deserves, the principle of fiscal responsi-
bility is an integral part of the traditional Keynesian
message. As noted by Tobin (1993), the Keynesian
macroeconomic concept applies to both sides of the
medal: a fiscal surplus is the right means for contain-
ing excess expenditure, while a deficit is an element
which can help to overcome situations of recession.
Macroeconomic stabilization calls for counter-cycli-
cal regulation of demand, applied in a reasonably
symmetrical manner. The difference from the neo-
classical view is that in this case it is legitimate to
adopt more active regulatory policies, leading to
more pronounced fluctuations in the fiscal balance,
but always giving a result of zero over the cycle as a
whole.
The degree of smoothing of the economic cycle
achieved through the automatic fiscal stabilizers dif-
fers significantly from one country to another, de-
pending on the structure of taxes and expenditure
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and the degree of openness of the economy. Fiscal
policy is naturally less efficacious in more open
economies: much larger budgetary fluctuations are
needed in order to obtain the same degree of stabili-
zation of GDP. The OECD (1993) considers that, in the
case of the European economies, the operation of the
automatic stabilizers reduces the magnitude of cycles
by 25%; Pisani-Ferry, Italianer and Lescure (1993)
estimate a stabilizing effect of over 35% in Germany
and France. In the case of more closed economies,
such as the United States and Japan, the effect is
even more significant, even though the fiscal stabi-
lizers are smaller (OECD, 1993). In the case of the
United States, Weise (1996) calculates that elimina-
tion of the anti-cyclical reaction of the public balance
(offsetting the deficit with smaller expenditure)
would increase the magnitude of recessions by be-
tween one-third and one-half. Finally, the European
Commission (1997), using simulations carried out
with the QUEST model, calculates that the stabilizing
impact is around 30%: in other words, fluctuations in
GDP are reduced by almost a third in comparison
with a situation where the changes in public expendi-
ture and income are not offset by others which com-
pensate for them. As we can see, the role of the
automatic stabilizers in fiscal policy management is
once again being actively debated in the industrial-
ized countries.
Let us now write the equation for the public def-
icit as follows (European Commission, 1997):
d = d
e
- (α + β)GAP (1)
where d
e
represents the fixed structural component of
the public balance, α is the marginal sensitivity of
the public balance to the GDP gap, β is the
discretional reaction of the authorities to the cycle,
and GAP is the GDP gap, as defined below. The fixed
structural component should be zero, if there is no
deficit skew. The tax smoothing theory also assumes
that there are no discretional policies, so that β=0.
In this case, the aim of fiscal policy is to maintain a
constant tax rate, so that, as a corollary, the public
debt absorbs the cyclical fluctuations, allowing the
spontaneous automatic stabilizer mechanisms to
come into action.
Curiously enough (albeit using different argu-
ments), both old Keynesians and supporters of the
new classical economics prescribe similar rules for
fiscal policy. This kind of “theoretical agreement”,
which gives priority to the objectives of tax smooth-
ing and/or regulation of the level of activity rather
than annual deficit targets, seeks consistency over
time through explicit agreements on the control of
the public debt throughout the cycle. A policy of this
type, though optimal for the efficient management of
the public finances, is based however on vulnerable
and/or controversial assumptions, such as the need
for a certain symmetry in the cycles and the absence
of lasting effects of the latter.
Such theories accept that deficits may be legiti-
mate or even necessary in periods of crisis, but the
recommendation that surpluses should be generated
in periods of full employment has been less success-
ful, since there is ample evidence of a bias towards a
structural negative balance. The absence of fiscal
discipline in modern democracies has been analysed
on the basis of the linked concepts of fiscal illusion
and asymmetrical stabilization policies (Buchanan
and Wagner, 1977). Fiscal illusion means that voters
do not fully grasp the implications of the govern-
ment’s constraints over time. When they are invited
to support a programme of expenditure to be fi-
nanced with a larger deficit, voters overestimate the
advantages of that expenditure and underestimate the
future tax burden it will involve. Opportunistic poli-
ticians take advantage of this situation to increase ex-
penditure more than income. According to this view,
Keynesianism greatly encouraged the appearance of
excessive deficits and the abandonment of the re-
sponsible rule of balanced fiscal accounts. In the
past, Keynesian recipes have been asymmetrical:
politicians are always ready to accept deficits in peri-
ods of recession, but they forget to generate sur-
pluses once the recession is over. An argument close
to the concept of the fiscal illusion is that of the pol-
icy cycle. Voters reward demagogic politicians with-
out understanding, or without learning from the
experience of their own or other countries, that ex-
pansionist policies must be paid for some day. At
election time, politicians in the government expand
public expenditure, which has to be financed by vot-
ers after the elections.
Recent publications explain the persistence of
deficits and debts by institutional considerations. In
this respect, Von Hagen (1992) investigated the im-
portance of budgetary institutions in the evolution of
indebtedness and prepared structural indexes for
twelve OECD countries as a function of five national
characteristics: i) the power of the Prime Minister, or
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of the Minister of Finance, in negotiations within the
government; ii) the limitations on parliamentary
amendments; iii) the way the budget is voted in par-
liament (globally, or item by item); iv) the degree of
transparency of the budget, and v) the flexibility of
the budget implementation process. The information
put forward in support of the structural hypothesis is
convincing: the indicators on the type of budgetary
institutions do indeed help to explain the differences
in deficits and debt/GDP ratios between the OECD
countries.
Alesina, Haussman, Hommes and Stein (1999)
made a similar study for the Latin American coun-
tries, using information on legislation and effective
budgeting practices obtained through questionnaires
answered by the persons responsible for budgetary
policy in the various countries. Indicators of budget-
ary procedures were constructed for twenty coun-
tries, on the basis of ten particular features of the
process, ranging from restrictions and controls on
public indebtedness to requirements for the adoption
of amendments in Congress and including the degree
of autonomy of local governments and public enter-
prises as regards decisions on indebtedness. The em-
pirical results were consistent: when considering the
various economic determinants of the deficit it was
confirmed that procedures which are more clearly
defined and/or transparent help to secure greater con-
trol over the fiscal deficit. Naturally, except in a few
cases, the procedures are not responsible for the defi-
cits, but it is also a fact that the prevailing institu-
tional arrangements do facilitate or impede the
capacity to react to imbalances arising from exoge-
nous disturbances. The correction of excessively
rigid procedures and of such common defects as lack
of transparency and of cooperation among the differ-
ent levels of government is essential if it is desired to
recover control over budgetary processes, keep pub-
lic indebtedness under control and, of course, im-
prove the efficacy of public policies.
2. A transparent and consistent institutional
design
However, discretional fiscal policies usually display
an asymmetrical approach which is reflected in an
increase in the public debt/GDP ratio, even in periods
of above-average growth. A study made in the Euro-
pean Union countries on the evolution between 1970
and 1990 of the cyclical and structural components
of the public balance according to the GDP gap (Eu-
ropean Commission, 1997) leads to some interesting
conclusions (figure 1).
In this figure, the straight line represents the
evolution of the cyclical component of the public
balance in the European Union, as measured by the
GDP gap, with the marginal sensitivity of the public
balance to changes in the level of activity standing at
0.5. In other words, for the member countries as a
whole, a variation of two points in the GDP gap is re-
flected in a deterioration of one percentage point of
GDP in the public balance.
The benchmark situation is one where the
discretional component is zero: in that case the auto-
matic stabilizers operate freely and the cyclical com-
ponent will be equal to the effective balance.2 As
will be noted, this has not been the case in the Euro-
pean Union, where discretional fiscal policies have
been of a counter-cyclical nature when the GDP gap
has been moderately negative (up to 2% of the po-
tential GDP) or strongly positive (over 2% of the po-
tential GDP). When there have been moderate
contractions, in addition to the action of the auto-
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2 Figure 1 represents a stylized situation in which it was as-
sumed that the discretional deficit was zero in “normal” condi-
tions during the period studied, although in reality it was close
to three points of GDP.
matic stabilizers there has been a tendency to
adopt expansionary fiscal policies, but when the GDP
gap has been strongly negative governments have
adopted pro-cyclical policies giving priority to
short-term objectives of creditworthiness rather than
regulation. In acute recessions, conflicts are height-
ened and it is very likely that the tendency to reduce
the deficit will adversely affect the functioning of the
economy. In these situations it is important to deter-
mine which is the lesser evil.
When the GDP gap is moderately positive, “mi-
rages” tend to arise and fiscal policy tends to be re-
laxed, neglecting the opportunity to take action to
deal with the structural component of the deficit.
This is probably the commonest situation in which
symmetry of fiscal policy could be secured. More
determined action is called for when the economy is
far above its trend level of growth, since this limits
the effectiveness of economic policies and generates
a bias towards a deficit and heavy public indebted-
ness.
As the consistency of fiscal policy over time is
not something that takes place spontaneously, mech-
anisms must be established to secure this. The initial
conditions of the public finances largely determine
the reaction to episodes of recession. In the European
Union, countries with moderate deficits and debts
have managed to use the available room for action
by applying stabilization policies. Contrary to what
might be expected, the main stabilization instrument
has been public expenditure in recessions, since the
discretional component of taxes has even increased
(Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1997).
Preserving the intervention capacity needed to
tackle adverse economic events calls for strict disci-
pline in normal circumstances. Fiscal discipline and
flexibility are thus two fundamental principles of
budgetary policy in the present process of economic
and financial globalization. Fiscal discipline is essen-
tial in order to give credibility to monetary policy,
while flexibility is essential in order to cope with un-
expected situations in a highly changeable macroeco-
nomic environment. The first of these principles was
expressed in the Maastricht Treaty, in the transitional
phase to the European Monetary Union, while the
second was a complement to the creation of the Euro
in the Stability and Growth Pact signed in Amster-
dam in the summer of 1997.
The aim of securing fiscal discipline meant that
it was first of all necessary to establish eligibility cri-
teria for the formation of the single currency zone,
imposing maximum limits for the deficit and public
debt in terms of GDP, and then lay down penalties for
countries that do not comply with them. The
Maastricht Treaty established a ceiling of 3% for the
public deficit, while the Stability and Growth Pact
provided for a scale of penalties in the event of
persistent excessive deficits. Continuing with the ef-
forts to secure “fiscal virtue”, the Dublin Declaration
of the European Council (Dublin, May 1998) recom-
mends members to consolidate the situation in order
to arrive in the medium term at a financial position
close to balance or surplus. The fiscal situation
sought by the European Union countries in “normal”
economic conditions corresponds to a balanced bud-
get corrected to take account of the influence of cy-
clical fluctuations in economic activity.
Although this latter condition is a stricter crite-
rion than that of the Maastricht Treaty, it provides
quite a broad degree of flexibility in fiscal policy
management compared with models based on perma-
nent balance. Since the historical average rate of
public investment in Europe has been 3% of GDP, a
reference value of 3% of GDP for the deficit is some-
thing like a “golden rule” in public finances: indebt-
edness is authorized if it stays within the limits of
capital expenditure (Corsetti and Roubini, 1996). If
investment is profitable for the public sector, it will
assure future current income flows to cover the cost
of the debt. The Maastricht Treaty may thus be inter-
preted as an implicit rule on current account balance
in the public accounts. This golden rule, which is
more flexible than those calling for a balanced bud-
get and sustainable deficits, is based on a macroeco-
nomic rationale: the budget must be neutral with
regard to the consumption and saving decisions of
private agents.
In England, the rules adopted for the budget
since 1998 are as follows: i) throughout the cycle,
the government will only contract debt for invest-
ment and not for financing current expenditure; ii) as
a proportion of GDP, the public debt will be kept at a
stable and prudent level throughout the cycle (see
United Kingdom, 1998). The government undertakes
to act within well-defined limits, but not in abso-
lutely strict terms. A certain degree of discretionality
is maintained, as the characteristics of the cycle are
not precisely defined.
In contrast, the Stability and Growth Pact, which
was signed by the countries making up the Euro
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zone, defines an optimal medium-term path to fol-
low, and in this sense it is stricter than the “golden
rule” and the Maastricht Treaty itself, since they only
define ceilings for the deficit. The Pact does however
allow for more flexible interpretation of the require-
ments in terms of the balance, since it accepts higher
(though limited) deficits due to transitory cyclical
factors. The procedures for the acceptance of such
deficits are clearly laid down in the “Protocol on Ex-
cessive Deficit Procedure”, which establishes the cri-
teria on exceptions (excessive deficits must be due to
situations outside the normal range of circumstances)
and their transitory nature (the deficit can be kept
outside the 3% limit only for a specified length of
time). The exception clause can be invoked when the
excessive deficit is due to some unusual situation
which is beyond the control of the member State and
has a significant impact on the financial position of
the public sector. In the event of a recession which is
more severe than expected, governments can exceed
the 3% limit for a reasonable length of time, explain-
ing the reasons for this. The Pact gives countries
with an excessive deficit some leeway for adjusting
their public accounts: they are not subject to sanc-
tions when they suffer a recession of over 2% per
year, and they can claim exceptional circumstances
when the recession is between 0.75% and 2% (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997). As regards the clause on
the transitory nature of the deficits, countries can
maintain excessive deficits only during the year of
the recession. If the Commission’s forecasting ser-
vice indicates that the country is going to continue
with an excessive deficit in the year following the
period of recession, it is presumed that sanctions
may be in order. Thus, correction of the excessive
deficit must be completed within two years after its
occurrence or one year after its identification, save
when there are exceptional circumstances.
As Buti, Franco and Ongena (1998) point out,
the ceiling of 3% of GDP for the effective deficit is
not much different from a target for the structural
deficit. The only difference is that the latter can be
selected by the countries themselves, fixing the opti-
mum “buffer” in line with their own preferences. In
order to identify a safe medium-term target, the mag-
nitude of the cyclical component of the deficit must
be estimated. The establishment of spaces for the full
operation of the automatic fiscal stabilizers in peri-
ods of recession would provide a further instrument
for securing a more stable monetary policy. The
combined impact of monetary measures and the
above-mentioned stabilizers should normally be
enough to relieve transitory situations of recession
(European Commission, 1997). As already noted, the
efficacy of these policies depends to a large extent
on the initial conditions, which is why it is so impor-
tant to seek mechanisms that ensure dynamic consis-
tency.
The Stability and Growth Pact was a significant
advance in this direction. It establishes medium-term
objectives in terms of balanced or surplus fiscal posi-
tions, and binds its members to present three-year
stabilization programmes which specify how these
objectives are to be attained. This combination of
medium-term goals with annual follow-ups of the
measures applied could be a very useful example for
the Latin American countries, which are just begin-
ning to address the question of macroeconomic coor-
dination in the context of integration agreements.
In Latin America, countries have been unwilling
or unable to use fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical
tool. When countries are in recession, their main
concern is to control episodes of financial insol-
vency, while in boom periods they tend to increase
public expenditure. The automatic fiscal stabilizers
must be understood in the strict sense, that is to say,
as symmetrical mechanisms which operate in both
phases of the cycle. Rather than defining the cycle
precisely, it is necessary to recognize the close links
between public income and expenditure, on the one
hand, and the level of activity on the other, accepting
a certain amount of deficit in exceptional circum-
stances but limiting it to a certain maximum level.
This ensures sustainability over time, while at the
same time maintaining enough flexibility to deal
with situations of recession without making exces-
sive adjustments.
If the condition of convergence of the effective
GDP and the potential GDP is fulfilled in the medium
term and the automatic stabilizers are allowed to op-
erate symmetrically, the balance will average zero
for the cycle and the country will retain its capacity
to contract debt to deal with unforeseen situations. In
this context, it is important to establish maximum
limits for the deficit, with provision for cyclical fluc-
tuations and some degree of fiscal discretionality. It
does not seem desirable to fix strict annual numerical
criteria, but rather ranges of values which ensure that
the basic principles of policy management listed ear-
lier are respected. A realistic attitude calls for the
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maintenance of some flexibility in economic policy
in order to keep open the possibility of intervention
in an uncertain environment.
Active intervention policies may be arbitrary,
with a possible bias towards excessive intervention,
exaggerated public expenditure or deficits that it is
hard to keep under control. Asymmetrical fiscal poli-
cies are not sustainable, giving rise to well-known
consequences as regards economic/political cycles
and/or the build-up of imbalances. Either for intellec-
tual reasons or on the grounds of experience, many
analysts tend to reject the model based on
discretional intervention because of the dangers of
populism and fiscal irresponsibility that it involves.
It seems desirable that outside limits should be estab-
lished or that Congress or other State bodies should
control possible excesses in the management of pub-
lic expenditure and tax rates, in order to avoid poten-
tially destabilizing fiscal cycles.
It is thus desirable to have mechanisms that en-
sure the consistency of fiscal policy, such as tax rev-
enue stabilization funds (ECLAC, 1998).
Compensatory mechanisms like these make it possi-
ble to save transitory income during boom periods
and use it later to stabilize expenditure in times of
crisis, thus helping to keep the public accounts “out
of the red” by injecting the accumulated income into
the budget when income is lower than expected and
acting as automatic stabilizers of expenditure, thus
avoiding the continuous “stop and go” syndrome in
fiscal management; they also have the advantage of
reducing the political costs of the cyclical deficit,
since the way the system operates will be more trans-
parent and will limit the inevitable debates on the
budget in Parliament. Such funds would be built up
with tax surpluses not foreseen in the budgets offi-
cially adopted during the period in question, and
would be used when conditions become adverse.
Ireland has an emergency fund equivalent to
0.7% of GDP in order to deal with changes in the pre-
vailing conditions (Ford, 1998). In Argentina, the
1999 Fiscal Responsibility Law included the estab-
lishment of the Fiscal Counter-cyclical Fund, which
can be used to help out the regular budget in reces-
sions which amount to three percentage points of
GDP or more. The resources of the Fund cannot be
used to finance permanent increases in current ex-
penditure. In other countries, such a fund could be
smaller, if the objective is to establish automatic
mechanisms to soften macroeconomic fluctuations.
The estimated impact of the economic cycle on the
budget for a GDP gap of 5%, a tax rate of 20% and an
income-elasticity of taxes of 1 is one percentage
point of GDP. It does not appear to be necessary to
build up large amounts of reserves, but rather to en-
sure the continuity of public programmes, at least
within the annual budget cycle.
In addition to the role of the traditional auto-
matic stabilizers, an expenditure budget programmed
for several years and less sensitive to short-term
fluctuations would heighten the stabilizing impact of
the public finances during the cycle and would un-
doubtedly increase the efficiency of public expendi-
ture. As noted in a forthcoming ECLAC document:
“the management of public expenditure should be
governed, on the one hand, by clear criteria of
long-term stability, especially in the case of operat-
ing expenditure. Its main counter-cyclical component
should be social safety nets. Consequently, these
safety nets, together with public revenue stabilization
funds, should be the basic instruments for the
counter-cyclical management of the public finances
during the economic cycle”.
Because of the weakness of the institutional ma-
chinery for social protection in Latin America, in
some cases the operation of the automatic stabilizers
alone might not be sufficient: in this event, it might
be necessary to increase public employment or trans-
fers discretionally. The thought of deficits or in-
creases in public expenditure or transfers during
period of recession might cause cold shivers, but
what is needed is to prepare efficient plans of high
social profitability which can absorb at least a signif-
icant part of cyclical unemployment. The mecha-
nisms for this must be of a transitory nature, in order
not to endanger the progress already made, and
should be backed by the necessary political consen-
sus in situations of excessive unemployment. In such
cases, rather than trying to stimulate demand by re-
ducing taxes, fiscal policy should seek ways of ex-
panding demand through expenditure on public
investment or incentives for private investment in
infrastructural sectors.
If some degree of transitory deficit is accepted,
subject to the commitment to generate a correspond-
ing surplus later, or if there is a tax stabilization
fund, programmes of this type would be sustainable.
Suitable instruments for this purpose should combine
various characteristics, such as being reversible and
being capable of rapid intervention, in order not to
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act too late and thus have a pro-cyclical effect on
GDP. Such interventions call, on the one hand, for
banks of duly evaluated projects, in order to avoid
faulty resource allocation which would prejudice
long-term growth, and on the other for due coordina-
tion with the decentralized agents responsible for
making the investments. It must also be borne in
mind that direct or indirect measures to stimulate de-
mand produce their effects on the economy with a
lag which is difficult to estimate, so that there is a
danger of over-reaction.
Quite apart from complying with numerical ob-
jectives regarding the balance, a more active fiscal
policy can help to regulate the short-term situation
more effectively. In order for macroeconomic man-
agement to be efficient (especially when there are
different types of disturbances), a growing consensus
on taxation must be achieved among the economic
agents, which means that instruments must be avail-
able for reducing private and public expenditure in
conditions of excess demand. Such instruments
could include taxes on households and companies
and the fiscal adjustment itself.
Tax instruments can be used to check oscilla-
tions in private expenditure if the authorities have
some degree of freedom to fix tax rates. Some inter-
esting proposals have been made to establish ranges
of permissible tax rates by law, so that the rates actu-
ally applied can be varied according to the current
conditions. There may, however, be a dangerous
temptation for the authorities to keep the rates al-
ways at their highest level in order to cover expendi-
ture or achieve a surplus. In practice it has been very
difficult to reach an agreement between the Execu-
tive and the Legislature on how to use tax rates effi-
ciently for the purpose of stabilization. Although
these rates are the most powerful instrument for
managing the evolution of private expenditure di-
rectly and efficiently, they are only used to a very
limited extent in Latin America.
The idea of flexible taxes is an attractive con-
cept and would aid in macroeconomic management,
but its application raises many problems. Thus, for
example, if the flexible tax is the Value Added Tax
(VAT) –say, in a range between 16 and 20%– its
downward rigidity could be enormous as long as
such strict deficit targets as those currently existing
in Latin America are maintained. In other words, it
may be very difficult to explain why a reduction in
taxes is necessary when there is a risk that the public
balance may deteriorate in a situation of recession or
why tax rates should be raised when there is a sur-
plus in the upper part of the cycle.
From a macroeconomic viewpoint, management
of personal income taxes withheld at source is the
best instrument for short-term regulation. But how
can this be explained to the few wage-earners who
are subject to such taxes, who would bear the whole
burden of the adjustments and whose take-home pay
would vary from month to month? In these circum-
stances, consensus on taxation would be achieved
with greater horizontal and vertical equity by broad-
ening the tax base and reducing evasion. Flexible tax
policies are only justifiable when tax collection
ceases to be concentrated on only a few taxpayers.
At present, it would seem to be simpler to progress
in the direction of the establishment of stabilization
funds or the creation of longer-term debt instru-
ments. As already noted, expenditure is used much
more than taxes as a counter-cyclical instrument.
Furthermore, a temporary increase in expenditure on
public employment or transfers would seem to have
less regressive effects on income distribution than
the (transitory?) reduction of taxes for the middle or
high income deciles.
One of the main questions with regard to fiscal
policy, as noted earlier, is the need for a clear separa-
tion between the transitory and permanent compo-
nents of the public finances. The economic evolution
of the Latin American countries in the 1990s has
clearly shown once again that fluctuations due to
events which are transitory or not sustainable in the
medium term have played a dominant role in the per-
formance of the public accounts. The challenge is to
design instruments which guide the budget process
towards a state of discipline with flexibility in which
the transitory factors are clearly identified and which
ensures a form of management consistent with the
indispensable “fiscal covenant” required by society
in the region (ECLAC, 1998).
Fiscal policy offers a powerful instrument for
counteracting the temptation to apply expansive poli-
cies in boom periods and recessionary ones in times
of crisis. In the words of Ocampo (1999): “paying
too much attention to crisis management ignores a
fact which ought to be evident: that national authori-
ties’ freedom of action is greater in booms than in
crises”. As the same author goes on to say: “national
policies for coping with vulnerability should there-
fore be aimed at reducing the impact of domestic
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macroeconomic cycles, reducing expansionary pres-
sures on expenditure in boom periods, adopting mon-
etary and fiscal policies and arrangements for the
supervision and prudential regulation of financial
systems which have the same effect, and avoiding
the tendencies to exchange rate appreciation gener-
ated by an abundance of external resources”.
Rules may be defined as formal, observable re-
strictions on the behaviour of the economic authori-
ties which should remain in force for a substantial
period of time and involve substantial changes in
conditions. In managing economic policies in gen-
eral and fiscal policies in particular, imposing deter-
ministic rules in a stochastic world can only mean
introducing unnecessary rigidities. In contrast, a pol-
icy which retains a certain degree of discretion
within the context of explicit rules (“rule-based dis-
cretion”), which seeks to ensure the application of
counter-cyclical rules in normal times but maintains
the capacity to respond to unexpected situations, can
improve global macroeconomic performance and
prevent harmful fluctuations. We could think in
terms of developing an increasingly “prudential”
style of economic policy management (Boyer, 1999),
with a form of management which is relatively au-
tonomous but governed by explicit and socially
agreed rules so as to minimize systemic risks, inte-
grate positive and negative externalities, and facili-
tate policy coherence and coordination among the
different powers. It must not be forgotten that the
economic policy objectives in terms of inflation and
unemployment form a public policy of the greatest
importance and that it is therefore necessary to stim-
ulate at this level too a style of management based on
results which includes among its features transpar-
ency, responsibility and clear mechanisms for ren-
dering accounts.
III
Estimation of the potential GDP
Economic policy management is inconceivable
without proper distinction between trends and cy-
cles. This distinction makes it possible to analyse
the evolution of most of the macroeconomic aggre-
gates, such as inflation, employment, the external
deficit and the public deficit. In order to take deci-
sions it is essential to be able to discriminate be-
tween the conjunctural component of a phenomenon,
whose effects will go away with the return of the
level of activity to its trend path, and the structural
component, which is permanent and therefore calls
for specific policies. Thus, in order to identify transi-
tory phenomena, such as a temporary rise in the rate
of inflation, a change in cyclical unemployment, a
transitory increase in the external deficit or an in-
crease in the cyclical public deficit, it is necessary to
have a point of reference, a medium-term horizon
which we may call “normality”. The old concept of
the product gap, defined as the distance between the
effective GDP and its normal level, represents a sim-
ple summary measure of the position of the economy
in the cycle. For this reason, it is frequently used by
empirical economists, and a large variety of methods
have been proposed for making a diagnosis of the
position of the economy with respect to its growth
potential.
This exercise is no trivial matter, especially in
the Latin American countries. The question as to the
potential growth of the economies of the region has
given rise to various answers, ranging from
near-euphoria to excessive pessimism. In view of the
extraordinary volatility of the economies of the re-
gion, the task of identifying a medium-term path and
then taking decisions in the light of that abstract con-
cept might seem a complex and even useless exercise
in periods of great turbulence and upsets, but it nev-
ertheless contains an undeniable fact: that all agents,
both public and private, need a medium-term horizon
in order to take their decisions in a rational manner
and thus provide suitable conditions for raising the
potential growth rate.
Because of the importance of this matter –as
Barrel and Sefton (1995) noted, in view of its impor-
tance it is a pity that the product gap cannot be mea-
sured directly– most international agencies and
national planning bodies of the industrialized coun-
tries which engage in macroeconomic analysis pub-
lish their own estimates of the potential product of
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those countries.3 This is not the case in Latin Amer-
ica, for at least three reasons. The first of these is
economic: the degree of volatility has been so great
in recent decades that it is very difficult to identify
the economic cycle (in graphical terms, the evolution
of GDP resembles a roller coaster rather than a land-
scape of gently rolling hills). The second is political:
the concept of the potential product (the growth that
could be achieved in view of the evolution of the
global productivity of the factors of production) is
often confused with a voluntaristic objective (the
growth that needs to be attained in order to take care
of social demands and reduce poverty, for example).
The third reason is ideological: many analysts be-
lieve that economic reforms such as greater open-
ness, privatization and reform of the labour market
will raise the potential GDP, although in reality the
restrictions have much more to do with difficulties in
expanding the production frontier: excessive slug-
gishness of the capital accumulation process, slow
spread of technical progress, and consequent stagna-
tion of the global productivity of the factors of pro-
duction.
This is why this exercise seems particularly im-
portant for the Latin American countries. In the final
analysis, the potential GDP cannot depart much from
the trend GDP (the two variables converge in the me-
dium term), so that the estimation and use of the lat-
ter in taking decisions represents in itself an advance
towards prudent management of fiscal and monetary
policies. Ultimately, a sustainable growth rate cannot
be very different from the average for recent years,
and this should be reflected in the monetary and fis-
cal planning of the public authorities.
The potential product may be defined as the
maximum level of product that can be sustained on a
lasting basis without causing tensions in the econ-
omy and, more precisely, without causing inflation
to speed up (Le Bihan, Sterdyniak and Cour, 1997).
Thus, the potential product corresponds to the level
of activity compatible with stable inflation. It may be
defined as an indicator of aggregate supply, in a nor-
mal growth path, with a NAIRU-type natural unem-
ployment rate (non-accelerating inflation rate of
unemployment) and without situations of excess or
insufficient demand or the consequent inflationary or
deflationary pressures. The growth rate of the econ-
omy would be constantly at “cruising speed”, with a
stable rate of utilization of the capital and labour fac-
tors and a constant interest rate. The product gap
(GAP) is simply the difference between the effective
GDP (Y) and the potential GDP (Y*), and the relation
between the two may be written as follows:





As the level of the potential product is an indica-
tor of supply, the product gap represents the excess
or insufficiency of aggregate demand, thus giving an
indicator of the position of the economy in the cycle.
In this sense, the potential GDP may be assimilated to
the recent past performance registered in the trend
GDP: the two variables converge in the medium term.
It is also important to distinguish the potential GDP
from the natural or optimum GDP, or the GDP at flexi-
ble prices, which may be defined as the maximum
level of product attainable if the distortions in the
economy due to the existence of positive marginal
tax rates or imperfect markets are eliminated. This
distinction is of fundamental importance: macroeco-
nomic policy seeks to guide the economy in the short
and medium term towards its trend GDP path and not
towards its optimum level of flexible prices. To ob-
tain the latter it is necessary to make structural re-
forms designed to improve the efficiency of markets
by stimulating competition and reducing the rigidi-
ties associated with the process of fixing prices and
nominal wages.
There are various methods of a statistical (trend
adjustment, movable averages, Hodrick-Prescott fil-
ter) or structural nature (aggregate production func-
tions) for estimating medium-term growth.4 The
statistical methods define potential growth by calcu-
lating a past production trend, assuming that the ob-
served GDP fluctuates around the potential GDP and
that the latter can be evaluated as the observed trend
GDP.
The most traditional way of calculating the trend
GDP is by adjustment of the product logarithm over a
linear trend. In this case, the trend and potential
growth is constant and identical with the average
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3 World Economic Outlook, of the International Monetary Fund;
Economic Perspectives, of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development; European Economy, of the Euro-
pean Commission, and other estimates by the central banks and
ministries of finance of the industrialized countries.
4 For an appraisal of the various methods, see Giorno, Richard-
son, Roseveare and Van de Noord (1995).
growth during the estimation period. In long series
the observed growth rate has many points of change,
however, so the segmented trends method is usually
used instead. This method has the following stages:
i) identification of past cycles; ii) estimation of the
successive average growth rates for each cycle;
iii) definition of a rule for the calculation of this
average growth rate for the current cycle, and iv) cal-
culation of the GDP gap from the difference between
the observed series and the estimated series of aver-
age GDP levels. The potential GDP is estimated by
means of a simple regression between the effective
GDP and the trend variable; the cyclical component is
simply the remainder of this equation.
The problem with this method is that it imposes
a deterministic trend which does not provide for the
occurrence of structural breaks within each cycle. It
is generally accepted, however, that the GDP trend
has stochastic and not only deterministic compo-
nents. It is assumed that structural breaks in aggre-
gate supply, although discrete, represent disturbances
that have permanent effects. Consequently, as it con-
fuses potential growth with average growth, a linear
representation of the GDP gap does not appear to be a
suitable description when the economy is subject to
continual supply disturbances.
The Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, in contrast,
seeks to identify the stochastic component of the
trend by adjusting a series which varies over time
without the need to define the structural break points.
It estimates a trend which simultaneously minimizes
a weighted average of the variance in the gap
between the GDP and the trend GDP and the
change in the growth rate of the trend GDP. The trend

















[(ln Y*t+1 - ln Y*t) - (ln Y*t - ln Y*t-1)]2
where λ is the weighting factor controlling the de-
gree of smoothing of the trend curve obtained. A
small value of λ gives a series close to the original
(if λ = 0, then the two are identical), while a high
value of λ reduces the sensitivity of the trend to fluc-
tuations in the effective GDP (if λ = ∞, the trend
merges with the average growth rate of the effective
GDP series). The value of the multiplier λ defines the
number of years included in the weighted movable
average: if its value rises, so too does the weight of
the most distant years in the estimation of the trend
GDP.
The problem is that an arbitrary value is as-
signed to λ, which determines the variance of the
trend GDP estimation. The variance of the trend GDP
falls as λ rises, and the size of the GDP gap thus in-
creases. Hodrick and Prescott (1997) recommend
values of λ = 1600 for quarterly series and λ = 100
for annual series. The empirical studies dealing with
international comparisons use various values ranging
from λ = 100 (Ongena and Roger, 1997) to λ = 25
(Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare and Van de Noord,
1995), λ = 10 (Doménech, Gómez and Taguas,
1997) and even λ = 6.5 (Pedersen, 1998). So far,
there are no satisfactory statistical tests that make it
possible to identify which trend-cycle breakdown is
better than others. The selection criteria are not very
clear: the main thing is to select a value of λ which
generates cycles similar to those estimated with other
methods (Giorno, Richardson, Roseveare and Van de
Noord, 1995). The same value is generally chosen
for all countries.
The Hodrick-Prescott filter is a symmetrical op-
erator, similar to a movable average, and the GDP gap
therefore comes to zero over the estimation period as
a whole. Furthermore, GDP gaps are smaller in rela-
tive terms when estimation of production functions,
for example, is used in the comparison. A classic
problem of these filters arises when the behaviour of
the starting and finishing points is not like the other
observations in the cycle, so that the trend is stuck to
the initial and final observations. Thus, for example,
if there is less growth in the last year of the series the
filter will underestimate the potential GDP for that
year. The solution to this problem would be to make
“reasonable” growth projections for two or more
years. In our case, the results are presented with a lag
of one year.
Series were available for twelve countries of the
region,5 obtained from the GDP calculated by ECLAC
for the period 1980-1998, the estimated GDP for
1999, and the projected GDP for the year 2000
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5 Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.
(ECLAC, 1999a and b). In order to give greater stabil-
ity to the estimates for the end of the period, we gen-
erally try to close the gap in the projection period,
assuming for this purpose that all the countries grow
at the rate of 5% in 2001 and 2002.
The sensitivity analyses show that the value ob-
tained for the GDP gap is quite uneven in the coun-
tries where there was the greatest variability. Figure
2 shows the GDP gap for Argentina, for different val-
ues of the parameter λ, and the differences are very
marked. Thus, for example, in 1990 the GDP gap
fluctuated between -10.5% for λ = 100 and -7.8% for
λ = 10: a distance of over 25% between the two esti-
mates. It is well known, of course, that any statistical
estimation method has a very high degree of uncer-
tainty. In order to facilitate the comparative analyses,
we chose a value of λ = 100 for all the countries, as
the European Commission does. It may be recalled
that these calculations are the accepted reference
values for all the signatories of the Stability and
Growth Pact.
Let us now look at the results obtained for the
GDP gap in the twelve countries in question (figure
3). This gap has fluctuated markedly in some Latin
American countries: in the 1980s it varied between
-11% and +17% in Peru, and in the 1990s it fluctu-
ated between -10.5% and +7.5% in Argentina, con-
trasting with absolute values that rarely exceed 4%
of the potential GDP in the industrialized countries
(Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1998). This indicator is a
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FIGURE 2
Argentina: Estimation of potential GDP
for different values of λ
Effective GDP HP 10 . . . . HP 25 HP 100
FIGURE 3
Latin American countries: GDP gap
A.   Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil and Chile
Argentina . . . Bolivia Brazil Chile
B. Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador and Mexico
Colombia . . . Costa Rica Ecuador Mexico
C. Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela








































valuable instrument for identifying potential imbal-
ances in the goods market, which show up first in the
trade account and later in the prices of non-tradeable
goods, and as an advance indicator it is useful for
identifying episodes of excess demand which could
foretell future inflationary pressures on the one hand
and external sector imbalances on the other.
The GDP gap is calculated on the level of the
trend GDP, with a filter which is similar to a movable
average, is symmetrical and incorporates lags; conse-
quently, cycles of excess demand or supply can last
as long as seven years. The symmetrical nature of the
filter is crucial when evaluating the GDP gap. The
Chilean case is instructive in this respect. After unin-
terrupted growth at an average rate of 7% per year
between 1990 and 1997, the 1998 slowdown and the
subsequent fall in 1999 reduced the trend GDP. Thus,
looking back, there was a positive GDP gap between
1991 and 1997 which symmetrically offsets the neg-
ative GDP gap of the years 1999 and 2000. Conse-
quently, the period which was defined as “normal”
was really a prolonged but transitory boom. It will be
recalled that, with the Hodrick-Prescott filter, dis-
crete breaks represent disturbances which have per-
manent effects. As already noted, it is not wise to
confuse potential growth with average past growth
without taking into account discrete episodes when
the economy is subject to continual disturbances in
supply. This means that the episode of recession is
not neutral in the evaluation of future growth, so it is
necessary to lower the estimate for the years to
come.
The great virtue of the Hodrick-Prescott filter
for generalized application in non-stationary time se-
ries is its simplicity. Many authors criticise the
method because it does not involve estimation but
rather an arbitrary separation between trend and cy-
cle, without taking into account the properties of the
series being studied. Furthermore, the estimation of
the potential GDP does not incorporate any economic
structure, thus seriously limiting its use as an indica-
tor of imbalances in the goods market. As an alterna-
tive to univariate estimation techniques, the method
for estimation of an aggregate production function
relates the potential GDP with the total productivity
trends of the factors and the amounts of labour and
capital used in the production process. As this filter
is generally used to calculate exogenous technical
progress and other elements of the production func-
tion, however, in practice the estimates turn out to be
quite similar (European Commission, 1995).
A “third way” is to use semi-structural methods,
like those used by the Central Bank of New Zealand
(Conway and Hunt, 1997). The idea is to use a
multivariate filter which uses the information con-
tained in some macroeconomic relations to identify
the variations in GDP which are attributable to distur-
bances in supply and demand. These authors enhance
the Hodrick-Prescott filter with information on a
Phillips curve, Okun’s Law, and a measure of the de-
gree of utilization of installed capacity. To be more
precise, they use the remainders of these three rela-
tions (between expected inflation and the GDP gap,
between deviations of unemployment from its trend
and deviations of GDP from its trend, and between
deviations of the degree of utilization of installed ca-
pacity from its trend and the GDP gap) to calibrate a
filter which makes it possible to identify distur-
bances in supply and demand. Although it is an inter-
esting proposition, this methodology suffers from
some weak points, such as the difficulty in determin-
ing the relative weight of each macroeconomic rela-
tion in the evolution of potential GDP and the greater
demands in terms of information, especially when
making comparisons between countries. In spite of
its limitations, the Hodrick-Prescott filter seems an
adequate solution if what is sought is an elementary
and immediate measure of macroeconomic fluctua-
tions which will make it possible to identify a “nor-
mal” horizon.
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IV
The magnitude of the automatic fiscal
stabilizers in Latin America
Variation in a component of public income or expen-
diture is cyclical when it is due to the difference
between the observed product and the trend product.
In the OECD methodology (Giorno, Richardson,
Roseveare and Van de Noord, 1995), the deficit is
broken down into a cyclical component and a struc-
tural one. The GDP gap is calculated as a percentage
of the potential GDP, so that the cyclical balance is
positive when the effective GDP is greater than the
trend GDP and negative when it is smaller than it. Ex-
pressed as a percentage of GDP, the structural deficit
is obtained from the difference between the global
deficit and the cyclical deficit. The idea is that the
structural or discretional deficit constitutes a suitable
indicator of the fiscal thrust: that is to say, the direc-
tion fiscal policy is taking.
In the case of many Latin American countries,
this information is not enough, because there are
many sources of non-tax income, ranging from the
profits of public enterprises that export commodities
to the income from privatization operations; further-
more, the variation in tax income is also due to other
variables, such as inflation. For this reason, the con-
cept of the structural deficit, as defined earlier, may
not be a good indicator of the thrust of fiscal policy.
Hereinafter, we will use “structural deficit” to refer
to an indicator which could be described more ex-
actly as the deficit “corrected for the influence of cy-
clical fluctuations in the level of activity”.
Nonetheless, fixing deficit targets which are inde-
pendent of other short-term oscillations (such as
commodity prices) is of prime importance. It is also
necessary to define what is “normal” for these forms
of non-tax income.
A decisive element in analysis of the magnitude
of the automatic fiscal stabilizers is the weight of tax
income in the economy and in the total resources of
the public sector. In 1997, tax revenue of the
non-financial public sector represented between 17
and 20 points of GDP in Argentina, Chile, Colombia,
Uruguay and Costa Rica; between 12 and 14 points
in Bolivia, Peru and Paraguay, and close to 10 points
in Venezuela, Mexico and Ecuador (table 1). In the
last three countries, as also in Bolivia, tax revenue of
that sector did not amount to even half of its total in-
come. In Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Peru and Uru-
guay, in contrast, the proportion was much higher.
Brazil is a special case: in 1997, tax revenue of the
non-financial public sector was equivalent to 25
points of GDP, and this figure has now risen to nearly
30 points.
Once we know the relation between tax income
and the GDP, all that is needed to obtain this break-
down is to estimate the income elasticity of taxes.
The OECD indicator of discretionality breaks down
taxation into its main components (taxes on goods
and services, on companies and on households) and
econometrically estimates the respective income
elasticities, whose values depend basically on the tax
structure and the progressiveness of the system. Ta-
ble 2 shows these values as estimated by the OECD
for some of its member countries. The income and
profits of enterprises are very sensitive to the level of
activity, which explains the high elasticity of revenue
from taxes on companies, ranging from 2.4 to 4.5,
depending on the country. Although the table shows
total elasticity, the importance of the lags between
the operations subject to tax and the actual collection
of the tax should be noted. This means that the
short-term or spot elasticity is much less than the
long-term elasticity in the case of taxes on compa-
nies. The income elasticity of taxes on households,
for its part, depends on the progressiveness of the
system. The OECD estimates range from 0.4 to 1.4,
with a simple average of 0.9.
In contrast, it may be assumed that indirect taxes
have an elasticity of one (instantaneous). In reality,
the elasticity of VAT, for example, depends on the
breakdown of private consumption between durable
and non-durable goods (in a recession, consumption
of durable goods goes down more sharply and the
elasticity of VAT with respect to total consumption is
therefore greater than unity at such times, if there are
differentiated tax rates); on the elasticity of the vol-
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ume of imports with respect to GDP (if this elasticity
is greater than unity, the VAT collected on imported
goods grows more rapidly than GDP; and on the rela-
tion between tax evasion and the economic cycle: as-
pects which are not usually taken into account in
comparative analyses but which can be highly signif-
icant in some situations. Many of the recessions in
Latin America are marked by drastic external adjust-
ments in which private consumption –and above all
its imported component– falls much more than GDP.
In this case, the elasticity would be much greater
than unity. These factors must be taken into account
when making analyses of the sensitivity to the level
of activity in each country and each situation. The in-
come elasticity of taxes with respect to GDP is an ag-
gregate which seeks to represent a structural
parameter, but it can vary on account of the many
factors that affect the tax bases, both on the side of
the components of aggregate demand and on the side
of income. Finally, the elasticity of social security
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TABLE 1
Latin America (12 countries): Tax income and
total income of the non-financial public sector, 1997
(Percentages)
Percentages of GDP
B as a percentage of A
A. Total income B. Tax income
Argentina 17.2 17.0 98.84
Bolivia 30.3 14.0 46.20
Brazil 28.9 24.8 85.81
Chile 33.5 19.4 55.94
Colombia 33.6 19.5 58.04
Costa Rica 29.8 16.5 55.37
Ecuador 23.8 9.1 38.24
Mexico 23.0 9.8a 42.61
Paraguay 21.1 11.8a 55.92
Peru a 14.2 12.0 84.51
Uruguay 32.0 18.4 57.50
Venezuela 31.9 10.1 31.66
Total Latin America and the Caribbean 23.3 13.9 53.46
Source: ECLAC, on the basis of official figures (see ECLAC, 1999a).
a Refers to central government.
TABLE 2
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (7 countries):
Elasticity with respect to GDP
Taxes on Taxes on Indirect Social security Current
companies households taxes contributions expenditure
United States 2.5 1.1 1.0 0.8 -0.1
Japan 3.7 1.2 1.0 0.6 -0.1
Germany 2.5 0.9 1.0 0.7 -0.2
France 3.0 1.4 1.0 0.7 -0.1
Italy 2.9 0.4 1.0 0.3 -
United Kingdom 4.5 1.3 1.0 1.0 -0.1
Canada 2.4 1.0 1.0 0.8 -0.3
Simple average 3.1 0.9 1.0 0.7 -0.1
Euro Zone 1.2 1.0 1.0 0.8 -0.2
Source: Giorno and Suyker (1997) for the countries and OECD (1999) for the Euro Zone.
contributions with respect to GDP is less than unity,
which shows that they are less sensitive to the eco-
nomic cycle.6
The mean aggregate elasticity depends on the
tax structure of the country. An aggregate elasticity
of one is estimated for the European Union, varying
from 1.38 for Great Britain to 0.77 for Italy (Euro-
pean Commission, 1995). In countries where direct
taxes, and above all taxes on companies, predomi-
nate this elasticity will be greater than unity, but in
those where indirect taxes are more important this
parameter is generally close to unity, on average.
This is so in the case of the Latin American coun-
tries.
Tax reforms, of which there have been many in
the region in the recent past, change the rates or
bases of the main taxes, thus making the econometric
estimation of tax elasticities very difficult. It is im-
portant to note that the results of breaking down the
deficit are less sensitive to changes in the values of
these elasticities than to changes in the measure-
ments of the GDP gap (Giorno and Suyker, 1997).
For this reason, we assume an income elasticity of
one for all the countries. On the expenditure side, to-
tal elasticity in the OECD countries is -0.1 on average
and varies as a function of the size of the transfers
provided for under the unemployment insurance
legislation. These protection mechanisms are practi-
cally non-existent in Latin America, so there are vir-
tually no expenditures or transfers automatically
linked to the economic cycle. Consequently, cyclical
expenditure is not taken into account in the calcula-
tions below.
The methodology adopted tends to underesti-
mate the cyclical component, by assuming an income
elasticity of taxes equal to unity for all countries.
Under this hypothesis, the relative size of the cycli-
cal deficit depends only on two factors: i) the gap be-
tween the effective and potential GDP, which
measures the distance between the effective growth
of the economy and its medium-term path, and ii) the
weight of taxes in total public income, which repre-
sents the proportion of revenue directly linked to the
level of activity.
The marginal sensitivity of the public balance to
changes in the level of activity is obtained by multi-
plying the aggregate elasticity by the rate of taxation.
Thus, for example, if the elasticity of taxes with
respect to GDP is one, the tax rate is 40% and the
product gap is -5%, the cyclical deterioration of
taxes is two points of GDP. For the average tax rates
in the region, which are of the order of 20%, the cy-
clical balance would be one point of GDP for a GDP
gap of 5% and two points for a gap of 10%. In other
words, the sensitivity of the public balance to
changes in the level of activity is close to 0.2 (for
each percentage point of the GDP gap, the public bal-
ance varies by 0.2 points of GDP), compared with the
value of 0.5 calculated for the European Union on
average (Buti, Franco and Ongena, 1998). Table 3
shows the marginal sensitivity of the public balance
to changes in the level of activity in some European
countries (for 1995) and in Latin America (for 1997).
It also shows the size of the GDP gap and the cyclical
deficit, with their maximum and minimum values,
for 1960-1996 in the case of Europe and 1980-1999
in the case of Latin America.
On average, the cyclical balance fluctuated be-
tween -0.5 and 0.8 points of GDP during the
1985-1996 period in the OECD countries (Giorno and
Suyker, 1997) and between -1.3 and 1.6 in the Euro-
pean Union in the period from 1960 to 1996 (Euro-
pean Commission, 1997). The range of variation is
enormous, with maximum and minimum values of
-4.1 and 3.2 for Sweden and -1.1 and 1.6 for Italy.
These differences are connected with the size of the
GDP gap and the marginal sensitivity of the budget to
changes in the level of activity.
In the case of the Latin American countries, the
size of the estimated GDP gap is noteworthy, with
minimum values close to or greater than 10% in
countries such as Argentina, Peru, Chile and Uru-
guay, and maximum values consistently over 5% of
the potential GDP. This marked volatility of the level
of activity (figure 4) has adverse consequences for
the public deficit, even though the marginal sensitiv-
ity of the public balance in the region is far below
that of the European Union.
If we combine these two elements –tax rate and
volatility of GDP– the application of this methodol-
ogy to the Latin Am erican countries (table 4) brings
out a cyclical component of the deficit which was
significant in the 1990s, with values close to or
higher than one point of GDP in Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica and Peru. It therefore
seems worth estimating this component in order to
evaluate the public accounts results properly. In
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6 Other authors, however, estimate elasticities greater than unity
for social security contributions: see, for example, Boscá,
Doménech and Taguas (1998).
Bolivia, Paraguay, Ecuador and Venezuela, in con-
trast, the cyclical component is only a little over 0.5
points of GDP. In Bolivia and Paraguay there were
only moderate macroeconomic fluctuations in the
1990s, and in Ecuador and Venezuela the income
from oil exports was equal to or greater than tax in-
come. The breakdown presented here leads in some
cases to a radically different interpretation of the
public accounts results. In some situations, their de-
terioration is due to factors of a conjunctural nature
rather than deliberate actions of the authorities. Thus,
for example, the increase in the deficit in 1999 in Ar-
gentina was due exclusively to its conjunctural com-
ponent. In this and other cases the position in the
cycle conceals a structural effort to improve the pub-
lic accounts.
The cyclical component is significant not only
because of its importance in the annual budget but
also because of its persistence over various periods.
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TABLE 3
European countries and Latin America: Magnitude of the automatic stabilizers a
Marginal GDP gap Cyclical component of
sensitivity of (as % of potential GDP) public balance (% GDP)
public balance
to GDP Minimum Maximum Minimum Maximum
Sweden 0.9 -4.6 (93) 3.7 (90) -4.1 (93) 3.2 (90)
Holland 0.8 -3.4 (83) 2.4 (74) -2.9 (83) 1.8 (74)
Denmark 0.7 -3.6 (81) 3.8 (86) -2.4 (81) 2.6 (86)
United Kingdom 0.6 -4.0 (82) 5.1 (88) -2.7 (82) 3.1 (89)
Spain 0.6 -4.5 (60) 5.3 (74) -2.1 (85) 2.7 (90)
Germany 0.5 -3.8 (67) 4.3 (91) -1.8 (67) 2.4 (91)
France 0.5 -2.1 (85) 3.2 (90) -1.1 (85) 1.6 (90)
Italy 0.5 -3.4 (75) 3.1 (80) -1.2 (75) 1.1 (80)
European Union 0.5 -2.2 (83) 3.2 (73) -1.3 (83) 1.6 (90)
Brazil 0.25 -7.3 (83) 5.5 (80) -1.2 (92) 0.7 (80)
Colombia 0.19 -5.1 (99) 4.5 (95) -1.0 (99) 0.9 (95)
Chile 0.19 -7.5 (83) 13.4 (81) -1.3 (83) 2.6 (81)
Uruguay 0.18 -8.5 (84) 9.7 (81) -1.1 (84) 1.6 (81)
Argentina 0.17 -10.5 (90) 7.5 (94) -1.3 (90) 1.3 (94)
Costa Rica 0.16 -5.7 (82) 8.7 (80) -0.7 (82) 0.9 (80)
Bolivia 0.14 -5.7 (86) 6.4 (81) -0.6 (86) 0.6 (86)
Paraguay b 0.12 -4.5 (86) 5.7 (81) -0.4 (86) 0.4 (95)
Peru b 0.12 -11.2 (92) 17.4 (87) -1.1 (92) 1.5 (87)
Mexico b 0.10 -5.6 (95) 5.2 (81) -0.5 (95) 0.6 (81)
Venezuela 0.10 -7.4 (89) 8.0 (92) -0.6 (99) 0.5 (97)
Ecuador 0.09 -5.0 (99) 4.7 (97) -0.5 (99) 0.4 (97)
Source: For the European countries: European Commission (1997). For Latin America: Economic Commission for Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECLAC) and calculations by the author.
a Numbers in brackets indicate year.
b Refers to central government.
FIGURE 4
Latin America (12 countries):
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TABLE 4
Latin America (selected countries): Cyclical and structural
components of the non-financial public sector accounts,a 1990-1999
(As a percentage of GDP)
Country and Variable 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999b
coverage
Argentina Observed balance -3.8 -1.6 -0.1 1.4 -0.2 -0.6 -1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -2.1
NPS Cyclical balance -1.3 -0.5 0.4 0.9 1.3 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.4 -0.5
Structural balance -2.5 -1.1 -0.5 0.5 -1.5 -0.8 -2.4 -1.6 -2.8 -1.6
Tax revenue 12.4 14.2 16.6 17.4 17.0 16.0 14.7 17.0 15.4
GDP gap -10.5% -3.7% 2.4% 5.1% 7.8% 1.5% 4.1% 1.3% 2.6% -3.4%
Bolivia Observed balance -4.5 -4.3 -4.4 -6.1 -3 -1.8 -2 -3.4 -4.0 -4.2
NFPS Cyclical balance - 0.1 - - 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 -0.1
(operational) Structural balance -4.5 -4.4 -4.4 -6.1 -3.1 -2.0 -2.2 -3.6 -4.3 -4.1
Tax revenue 7.3 7.6 9.5 10.3 10.4 11.5 12.1 12.8 14.0
GDP gap -0.4% 1.7% -0.1% 0.3% 1.0% 1.6% 2.0% 1.9% 2.4% -0.7%
Brazil Observed balance 1.4 -0.2 -1.8 -0.8 1.1 -5.2 -3.8 -4.3 -7.5 -8.5
NFPS Cyclical balance -0.5 -0.7 -1.2 -0.8 - 0.4 0.4 0.7 - -0.6
Structural balance 1.9 0.5 -0.6 - 1.1 -5.6 -4.2 -5.0 -7.5 -7.9
Tax revenue 25.0 21.5 21.5 22.7 25.2 25.3 24.6 24.8 26.7
GDP gap -2.1% -3.1% -5.5% -3.5% -0.1% 1.4% 1.6% 2.7% -0.1% -2.3%
Chile Observed balance 1.3 1.7 2.7 2.2 2.1 2.7 1.8 0.9 -0.8 -1.5
NFPS Cyclical balance -0.3 -0.2 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.9 1.1 0.7 -0.6
Structural balance 1.6 1.9 2.2 1.7 1.9 2.0 0.9 -0.2 -1.5 -0.9
Tax revenue 15.7 17.8 18.6 19.5 18.8 18.4 19.7 19.4 19.2
GDP gap -1.8% -1.1% 2.8% 2.7% 1.2% 3.8% 4.7% 5.9% 3.6% -2.9%
Colombia Observed balance -0.5 0.2 -0.2 0.1 1 -0.6 -2 -3.1 -3.4 -4.6
NFPS Cyclical balance - -0.3 -0.2 - 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.4 -1.0
Structural balance -0.5 0.5 - 0.1 0.5 -1.5 -2.7 -3.8 -3.8 -3.6
Tax revenue 14.9 16.2 16.9 19.1 19.4 19.6 19.2 19.5 20.1
GDP gap 0.2% -1.7% -1.5% -% 2.5% 4.5% 3.6% 3.7% 2.0% -5.1%
Costa Rica Observed balance -2.5 -0.1 0.7 0.6 -6.6 -2 -2.7 -1.5 -1.1
NFPS Cyclical balance 0.1 -0.2 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 -0.5 -0.6 -0.5 -
Structural balance -2.6 0.1 0.4 0.1 -7.1 -2.2 -2.2 -0.9 -0.6
Tax revenue 14.0 14.4 15.1 15.4 14.7 15.7 16.4 16.5 17.0
GDP gap 0.6% -1.2% 1.7% 3.3% 3.5% 1.5% -3.0% -3.7% -2.7% -0.1%
Ecuador Observed balance 0.1 -0.6 -1.2 -0.1 -0.2 -1.4 -3.1 -2.6 -6.2 -4.0
NFPS Cyclical balance -0.2 - - - 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.4 -0.5
Structural balance 0.3 -0.6 -1.2 -0.1 -0.3 -1.6 -3.3 -3.0 -6.6 -3.5
Tax revenue 7.5 7.4 7.1 7.4 7.7 8.6 7.2 9.1 9.8
GDP gap -2.9% -0.5% -% -0.3% 1.7% 2.4% 2.6% 4.6% 3.9% -5.0%
Mexico Observed balance -2.8 3.3 1.6 0.7 -0.3 -0.2 -0.1 -0.6 -1.2 -1.3
NFPS Cyclical balance c 0.1 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.4 -0.5 -0.3 -0.1 - -
Structural balance -2.9 3.0 1.2 0.5 -0.7 0.3 0.2 -0.5 -1.2 -1.3
Tax revenue c 11.5 12.0 12.4 11.4 11.3 9.2 8.9 9.8 10.5
GDP gap 0.5% 2.1% 3.1% 2.0% 3.7% -5.6% -3.9% -0.9% 0.3% -0.1%
Paraguay Observed balance 5.2 2.9 0.1 1.2 2.4 2.5 1.7 0.5 0.2 -1.5
NFPS Cyclical balance c 0.2 0.1 - 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.2 0.2 -0.1 -0.3
Structural balance 5.0 2.8 0.1 1.1 2.3 2.1 1.5 0.3 0.3 -1.2
Tax revenue c 9.5 9.4 9.3 9.3 10.7 12.2 11.6 11.8 11.1
GDP gap 2.1% 1.3% -% 1.0% 1.2% 3.1% 1.8% 2.0% -0.7% -2.7%
Countries such as Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colom-
bia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Uruguay and Venezuela reg-
istered declines in their GDP in 1999 and hence
strongly negative GDP gaps and cyclical balances.
These were offset in some cases by a positive cycli-
cal balance in previous years (since 1992 in Argen-
tina and Chile and since 1994 in Colombia and
Brazil): the condition of symmetry applied in these
calculations should be borne in mind.
The reading of the results obtained is simple: in
general terms, the cyclical component is seen to be
an important factor in the improvement in the public
accounts in the latter part of the 1990s. In many
countries the reactivation of the economy at rates
above the medium-term trend values led to positive
fiscal results, although these were partly due to tran-
sitory resources. The 1999 recession is a factor
which clearly shows the difficulty of establishing a
“normal” horizon. For example, three or four boom
years in succession tend to foster the perception of a
higher growth potential, prompting slacker fiscal be-
haviour, but subsequent events show that these per-
ceptions were over-optimistic. This is an important
point to bear in mind in view of the fact that the fail-
ure of attempts at pluri-annual budgetary planning
(to say nothing of political programmes) is due
mainly to over-optimism about medium-term
growth. It seems necessary to question this bias, us-
ing methods like those described above, in order to
ensure a more consistent and transparent form of
monetary and fiscal planning. The importance of this
matter is beyond doubt.
TABLE 4 (Concluded)
Country and Variable 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999b
coverage
Peru Observed balance -2.1 -1.5 -1.5 -1.5 2.9 -0.6 -1.5 -0.8 -0.9 -2.6
CG Cyclical balance -0.8 -0.8 -1.1 -0.8 - 0.6 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.1
Structural balance -1.3 -0.7 -0.4 -0.7 2.9 -1.2 -1.8 -1.6 -1.2 -2.7
Tax revenue 7.9 8.8 9.6 9.8 11.1 11.5 12.0 12.0 12.0
GDP gap 10.0% -8.8% 11.2% -8.6% 0.4% 4.9% 2.9% 6.9% 2.3% 0.7%
Uruguay Observed balance 0.3 1.3 1.4 -0.8 -2.4 -1.3 -1.1 -1.3 -0.5 -2.5
NFPS Cyclical balance -0.3 -0.3 0.4 0.4 0.8 - 0.4 -0.1 0.3 -0.6
Structural balance 0.6 1.6 1.0 -1.2 -3.2 -1.3 -1.5 -1.2 -0.8 -1.9
Tax revenue 15.9 16.5 16.5 16.5 16.4 15.7 15.9 18.4 18.6
GDP gap -1.9% -1.9% 2.3% 2.4% 5.0% 0.1% 2.3% -0.3% 1.7% -3.2%
Venezuela Observed balance 0.1 -2.2 -5.9 -1.3 -13.8 -6.8 7.2 2.6 -6.6 -4.0
NFPS Cyclical balance -0.1 0.2 0.4 0.3 -0.1 0.2 - 0.5 0.3 -0.6
Structural balance 0.2 -2.4 -6.3 -1.6 -13.7 -7.0 7.2 2.1 -6.9 -3.4
Tax revenue 4.0 4.6 5.0 5.8 8.8 9.2 8.7 10.1 11.0
GDP gap -3.6% 3.7% 8.0% 4.9% -1.3% 2.3% -% 4.8% 3.0% -5.6%
Source: For public sector and tax revenue figures: ECLAC, on the basis of official data. For the GDP gap: calculations by the author, on
the basis of ECLAC data, in 1995 dollars.
a NPS = national public sector.  NFPS = non-financial public sector.  CG = central government.
b The cyclical balance is obtained by multiplying the tax rate of the preceding year by the GDP gap. The values for the observed balance
are naturally preliminary values.
c Refers to central government.
AUTOMATIC FISCAL STABILIZERS • RICARDO MARTNER
C E P A L R E V I E W 7 0 • A P R I L 2 0 0 0 51
V
Conclusions
Estimation of the potential GDP with the
Hodrick-Prescott method provides an elementary and
immediate measure of macroeconomic fluctuations.
According to the results obtained, the GDP gap (as a
percentage of the potential GDP) varied between
-11% and 17% in the Latin American countries in
the 1980-1999 period. In the European Union, in
contrast, the same indicator measured by the same
means did not exceed 4% of the trend GDP. Such
marked volatility of the level of activity has adverse
consequences for the public deficit, and these are
even greater when tax revenue represents a consider-
able proportion of public income. It is essential to
identify a “sustainable” medium-term path and to
formulate fiscal policy as a function of permanent
sources of income generated when the economy is on
its trend path.
According to the calculations presented here, the
cyclical component of the central government deficit
amounts to a maximum of one point of GDP in Ar-
gentina, Brazil, Chile, Peru and Uruguay. Although
this amount is less than the levels registered in the
OECD countries (which may be explained both by the
method used, which may introduce a downward bias
in the results, and by the relatively lower importance
of tax revenue in the GDP) it is nevertheless by no
means negligible in absolute terms. The elasticity of
the public balance to changes in the level of activity
is estimated to be around 0.2 (for every percentage
point of the GDP gap the public balance varies by 0.2
points of GDP). The average value calculated for the
European Community is 0.5. The magnitude of the
automatic fiscal stabilizers and the uncertainty of the
macroeconomic environment therefore warrant the
adoption of prudent criteria regarding the manage-
ment of the public finances, not so much in terms of
precise annual deficit targets but rather in terms of
simple and transparent rules which ensure their me-
dium-term stability.
In this respect, the rules on fiscal policy should
not be based on the observed deficit, but rather on its
discretional component. The most important criterion
seems to be to seek a balanced budget in normal con-
ditions, which means planning expenditure and in-
come in the light of a medium-term view of public
finance management, thus avoiding constant varia-
tions in its formulation and execution. In economies
as volatile as those of Latin America, the public sec-
tor cannot become a sounding board for short-term
fluctuations. Full operation of the automatic fiscal
stabilizers in Latin America would help to smooth
out cyclical fluctuations, thus increasing long-term
growth, improving global macroeconomic perfor-
mance, and preventing the generation of harmful dis-
turbances.
Imposing deterministic rules in a stochastic
world can only bring in unnecessary rigidities; what
is needed instead is to construct a set of institutions
which ensure the application of counter-cyclical
rules in normal times, while at the same time main-
taining the capacity to respond to unforeseen situa-
tions. Economic policy management must be
increasingly cautionary and prudential, with a form
of management which is flexible but subject to so-
cially concerted rules and clear accountability mech-
anisms, so as to put into practice the principles of
transparency, stability and responsibility.
(Original: Spanish)
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